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There is a potential dispute as to whether the detention should be described as 'indefinite' given the Court's finding that it cannot be said that detention will never end. As most judges use the term uncritically, I have adopted it for the sake of clarity. 
THE LEGISLATION AND ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
The legislative regime creating a system of mandatory detention is notable for the simplicity of its design, the bluntness of its operation, and its absence of discretion. Section 189 of the Act provides that, if an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person. An 'unlawful non-citizen' is defined (via ss 13 and 14) as someone who is not an Australian citizen, and who does not hold a visa that is in effect, thus covering a very broad category of persons, including but not exclusive to those who arrive without a visa.
Other provisions of the Act limit immigration detention. Notably, s 196, headed 'Duration of detention', provides that an unlawful non-citizen detained under s 189 'must be kept in immigration detention until' he or she is removed, 16 deported 17 or granted a visa. 18 Mr Al-Kateb and Mr Al Khafaji had both requested removal in writing under s 198, which relevantly provided at the time that ' [a]n officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen who asks the Minister, in writing, to be so removed'.
McHugh J neatly summarises the two issues raised by the appeal in Al-Kateb as being whether ss 189, 196 and 198 , when properly construed, purport to authorise the indefinite detention of an unlawful non-citizen in circumstances where there is no real prospect of removal, and if they do purport to authorise such detention, whether they are beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth. 19 For the purposes of construction, the judges had to consider whether there is any ambiguity such as to allow the operation of certain principles of construction, notably what Gleeson CJ labels (following the English courts) a 'principle of legality' that a court will not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail the fundamental right against being deprived of one's liberty absent express words or necessary intendment.
The constitutional question concerned the potential limitations on the exercise of federal legislative power with respect to aliens arising either out of the head of power itself or as a result of the operation of Ch III of the Constitution and the exclusive vesting of federal judicial power in the judiciary. Specifically, the Court was concerned with whether the detention which the Act authorised could be characterised as a form of 'punishment' that can only be imposed by a body invested with and exercising federal judicial power. Addressing this issue required the Court to revisit the tests established, and assumptions made, in the seminal case of Lim.
THE MAJORITY'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Reading up the provisions: Justice Hayne's Uncertainty Principle
The majority's approach to construing the Act is represented by Hayne J's reasoning.
McHugh J deferred to his approach, 20 as did Heydon J, except with respect to the applicability of international law. 21 Hayne J noted 'two critical features' of the detention provisions identified by those arguing against their validity. First, detention is for an indeterminate length of time. Secondly, there may be cases where the events upon which detention will cease may not happen, or at least will not happen for a very long time. As his Honour noted, '[i]t is this uncertainty, about whether or when detention will cease, that is said to present issues about proper construction of the provisions, and to engage consideration of Ch III'. 22 Rather than creating the conditions of ambiguity which would allow the Court to presume the non-abrogation of the right of liberty, Hayne J saw the provisions' inherent uncertainty as necessarily and unambiguously providing for indeterminate detention. His Honour noted that the scheme set up by the Act requires removal to a country 23 and such removal can only be carried out with the co-operation of the receiving country and any countries through which the person must pass. As that co- Ibid 636 [217] (Hayne J). 23 Ibid 637 [218] .
operation is not always freely made available, ' [d]etention will continue until that cooperation is provided'. 24 This conclusion was also said to arise out of the Act's natural language, notably via the word 'practicable' (in s 198) which qualifies the duty to remove someone -the 'event' (or 'purpose') which ends detention. 25 Removal only becomes 'practicable' once the relevant uncertainty is resolved -once removal is no longer dependent upon the co-operation of persons other than the non-citizen and the relevant officer. 'Until' removal is practicable, the time for performance of the duty to remove does not 'arrive'. 26 And '[s]o long as the time for performance of that duty has not expired, s 196 in terms provides that the non-citizen must be detained.' 27 Uncertainty also comes into play when Hayne J tackles the minority's key construction argument: that there is an assumption in the legislation that a person can be removed which fails to address the facts before the Court (ie, that removal was unforeseeable). If the 'event' which ends detention cannot occur -cannot become 'practicable' -Hayne J's reasoning would not address the detainees' circumstances.
Clearly influenced by arguments made by the Solicitor-General, 28 Hayne J responded by contesting the view that the assumption was wrong: 29 ' Because there can be no certainty about whether or when the non-citizen will be removed, it cannot be said that the Act proceeds from a premise (that removal will be possible) which can be demonstrated to be false in any particular case.' 30 Callinan J made a similar statement, albeit not relying upon uncertainty as a predicate, 31 as did McHugh J in Woolley. 32 As a result, the majority concluded that as it cannot be said that removal can never happen, the assumption in the Act that removal will occur is not proven false, and the legislation thereby covered the factual situations before the Court.
Uncertainty thus has a double function. 33 First, it requires that a person be detained until the uncertainty about removal resolves itself. The term 'practicable' specifically imports such a meaning. Furthermore, because of the uncertainty in the achievement of the purpose of removal, the assumption inherent in the legislation that a person can be removed at some point in the future can (almost) never be disproved, regardless of their individual circumstances. There is no ambiguity, only uncertainty. And it matters _____________________________________________________________________________________ 24 Ibid. 25 His Honour used different words to describe the same provision. Thus removal is a 'purpose', 'event' or 'duty'. As the Solicitor-General noted in oral argument with respect to the eventual creation of a Palestinian state, 'you can never say, in any case, "These events will never occur"': Uncertainty also had a role to play in the interpretation of Ch III.
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Purposive detention, and distinguishing Calwell Hayne and Callinan JJ recognised the necessity of distinguishing the 1949 case of Koon Wing Lau v Calwell 34 in which Dixon J had read a temporal limitation into an analogous provision of the War-time Refugees Removal Act 1949 (Cth) providing for the custody of aliens awaiting deportation. As Hayne J noted, Dixon J read this provision to mean that 'a deportee may be held in custody for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation to deport him until he is placed on board the vessel' 35 and that 'unless within a reasonable time [the person to be deported] is placed on board a vessel he would be entitled to his discharge on habeas'. 36 For Hayne J, the fact that the Act expressly fixed the period of detention by requiring removal 'as soon as reasonably practicable' sufficiently distinguished Calwell, precluding the Court imposing its own 'reasonable time' limitation. 37 Callinan J added to this by noting that immediate deportation was in fact feasible in Calwell. 38 This marries with Hayne J's earlier analysis: it is only possible to read a 'reasonable time' proviso into the legislation once it becomes possible to deport or remove an alien.
With respect to establishing if the purpose of removal had been exhausted, only Callinan J explicitly entered the debate, hotly contested in argument, as to whether this is governed by a subjective or objective test. Picking up on the Solicitor-General's assertion that there is always a 'hope' that a Palestinian state will be created in the future, his Honour went further, asserting that '[t]he test is not whether the Minister harbours a hope, but whether she continues to have the intention of removing the appellant from the country.' 39 As we shall see, this view is informed by his Honour's express deference to the executive that is only implicit in Hayne and McHugh JJ's judgments.
Statutes and international law: questioning the rule of construction
As a result of their finding of an absence of ambiguity, the majority judges were able to disregard arguments relying upon the rule of construction that provisions should be read consistently with Australia's international obligations under human rights law, notably the prohibition against arbitrary detention in Art 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 40 Yet as each judge commented on the rule and its application, the Court's views cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In expressly refusing to endorse Hayne J's uncritical reference to the rule, Heydon J can be taken to object to its current status. And while Callinan J did not directly attack it, his Honour's use of equivocal language to describe the rule reflects a concern not to be seen to endorse it. 41 Only McHugh J mounted a direct assault on its status, asserting that 'under modern conditions' in which the number of sources and instruments of international law are so numerous, the rule has become a fiction. For his Honour, 'it is impossible to believe that, when the Parliament now legislates, it has in mind or is even aware of all the rules of international law'. 42 Given this equivocation, it is perhaps surprising that in Woolley his Honour undertook a detailed and sympathetic analysis of the argument that the mandatory detention regime is arbitrary under the ICCPR, albeit conceding that he could not rule on the matter. 46
THE MINORITY'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Assumptions of the possibility of removal Legislative assumptions and their proven falsity in the circumstances of the case were central to the minority's conclusion that the Act did not accommodate the situation before the Court. This is particularly characteristic of the Chief Justice's judgment, which opens by asserting that 'the Act envisages that the detention will come to an end' by the grant of a visa or the removal of the alien. 47 Specifically, the imperative in s 198 to remove a person as soon as reasonably practicable 'assumes the possibility of removal'. 48 And while the period of detention will be finite in the 'ordinary case', the Act does not expressly address the problem of 'exceptional cases' where removal is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 49 As with Hayne J (and McHugh J in Woolley), the Chief Justice recognised that it can rarely be said that the purpose of removal is unattainable 50 or that it will never become practicable. 51 However, he claimed that where removal is not reasonably practicable, the purpose of detention is 'in suspense'. 52 And while the Act makes no express provision for such suspension, nor does it expressly provide for indefinite or permanent detention in a case where the assumption underlying s 198 is false -in this case, where the appellant, 'through no fault of his own or of the authorities', cannot be removed. 53 In such legislative silence, the rule of construction (which his Honour here for the first time has described as a 'principle of legality') can come into play:
Courts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail certain human rights or freedoms (of which personal liberty is the most basic) unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language. 54 Applying this test, his Honour concluded that '[t]he possibility that a person, regardless of personal circumstances, regardless of whether he or she is a danger to the community, and regardless of whether he or she might abscond, can be subjected to indefinite, and perhaps permanent, administrative detention is not one to be dealt with by implication.' 55 The fact that the detention is mandatory rather than discretionary further supported his Honour's choice to treat the detention as suspended, rather than indefinite, his Honour noting that he would 'find it easier to discern a legislative intention to confer a power of indefinite administrative detention if the power were coupled with a discretion enabling its operation to be related to the circumstances of individual cases '. 56 Purpose implies a temporal limitation: Justice Gummow's construction Gummow J was similarly keen to focus on assumptions and the purposive nature of detention. Expressly relying on Dixon J's approach in Calwell, his Honour asserted not only that the construction in the current case 'should allow for what was said in Calwell concerning the duration of purposive powers such as those involved here', 57 but that the case also provided guidance on the appropriate constitutional role of the Court. Notably, a Court should be slow to interpret purposive powers such that validity is dependent upon the view of the executive. 58 Consistent with this context, his Honour formulated the principle of interpretation at play in a manner somewhat different from Gleeson CJ, focusing on the appropriate judicial attitude rather than a presumed parliamentary intention:
[I]t is important to eschew, if a construction doing so is reasonably open, a reading of the legislation which recognises a power to keep a detainee in custody for an unlimited time. That reluctance is evident in the construction given the legislation in Calwell. Rather, temporal limits are linked to the purposive nature of the detention requirement in the legislation. 59 It was then relatively easy to construe the statute. First, his Honour identified a host of temporal elements in the relevant provisions, including the words 'until', ' 'under' (which indicated an element of process), 'as soon as', 'practicable' and 'reasonably'. 60 His Honour then tied these temporal elements to a discussion of the purpose of removal, and the underlying legislative assumptions: if the appellant cannot be removed and 'as a matter of reasonable practicability is unlikely to be removed', s 198 no longer retains a present purpose of facilitating reasonably prospective removal -its operation is spent, or at least suspended. As a consequence, the temporal imperative imposed by the word 'until' in s 196 'loses a necessary assumption for its continued operation'. 61 His Honour concluded by entering the debate about whether a subjective 'hope' will support a purpose:
The point of present importance for the appellant is that the continued detention of this stateless person is not mandated by the hope of the Minister, triumphing over present experience, that at some future time some other State may be prepared to receive the appellant. 62 This is a tacit reference to the Solicitor-General's 'never say never' argument that so swayed the majority. 63 For Hayne J, the 'assumption' in the legislation could not be disproved: as long as there is the possibility of removal, the purpose of detention is not spent. By contrast, for Gummow J such 'hope' must not triumph over the practical reality of 'present experience' -an oblique reference to the finding of fact that removal is currently unforeseeable. 64
International law and purposive interpretation Kirby J was the only judge in the minority to tackle the majority's criticisms of the applicability of international law. 65 For Kirby J, McHugh J's concern about the 'subjective intentions' of Parliament runs counter to the dominant purposive approach to statutory interpretation -an approach which his Honour noted McHugh J has 'greatly influenced'. 66 According to Kirby J, the purposive approach is an 'objective construct' where the meaning of an Act 'is declared by the courts after the application of relevant interpretive principles', 67 one of which is to uphold compliance with international human rights law. This principle, he claimed, applies 'because, as Professor Ian Brownlie has explained, municipal or domestic courts when deciding cases to which international law is relevant, are exercising a form of international jurisdiction ' Ibid.
68
Ibid.
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CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS -THE MAJORITY APPROACH
Two connected constitutional issues arose in these cases. The first concerned the scope of the aliens power; the second concerned the potential operation of Ch III as a brake on legislative power. 69 With respect to Ch III, the Court confronted the formulation of the majority judgment in Lim in which Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ declared that, with certain exceptions, 'the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt'. 70 Their Honours described this as 'a constitutional immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth authority except pursuant to an order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth'. 71 This in turn formed the basis for their finding that provisions for the detention of unlawful non-citizens pending deportation:
will be valid laws if the detention which they require and authorize is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an application for an entry permit to be made and considered. … [I]f the detention which [the impugned laws] require and authorize is not so limited ... they will be of a punitive nature and contravene Ch. III's insistence that the judicial power of the Commonwealth be vested exclusively in the courts which it designates. 72 In the interests of economy, I will refer to the above statement as the 'Lim test'.
The aliens power: detention for the purpose of exclusion
For the majority judges, legislation requiring the detention of aliens for the purpose of ensuring their exclusion from the Australian community falls directly within the aliens head of power. Hayne J relied on the 1906 case of Robtelmes v Brenan, 73 noting Griffith CJ's assertion that the aliens power 'must surely, if it includes anything, include the power to determine the conditions under which aliens may be admitted to the country, the conditions under which they may be permitted to remain in the country, and the conditions under which they may be deported from it'. 74 In an oblique reference to the judicial role, his Honour cited Griffith CJ's assertion that 'the Commonwealth Parliament has under that delegation of power authority to make any laws that it may think fit for that purpose; and it is not for the judicial branch of the Government to review their actions, or to consider whether the means that they have adopted are wise or unwise.' 75 While there are many purposes that will support detention under the aliens power, it is the purpose of 'exclusion' that Hayne J insisted supported the instance of detention before the Court, noting (albeit without citing authority) that
While other constitutional questions arose, these two categories cover the main issues. (Hayne J). ____________________________________________________________________________________ a law which, in its operation, provided that those non-citizens who do not have permission to enter and remain in Australia, but manage to find their way here, are to be excluded from the Australian community by their removal from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable and, if removal is not practicable, their segregation from the community by detention, would fall within power. 76 As his Honour later acknowledged, this is a broader expression of the power of detention than that implicit in the joint reasons in Lim. 77 McHugh J similarly endorsed detention for the purpose of exclusion, but not in the context of the characterisation of the head of power. Rather, his Honour was anxious to focus the characterisation debate squarely on the subject matter itself, leaving the purpose of exclusion for his discussion of the operation of Ch III. Consistent with his position in Lim, his Honour thus asserted that 'any law that has aliens as its subject is a law with respect to aliens'. 78 Shunning a debate about 'purpose' within the context of characterisation may have been intended to avoid any suggestion that the detention legislation is supported by the incidental power and thus subject to a 'reasonable necessity' test -a position potentially open on one reading of the Lim Court's reference to detention being an 'incident' of executive power, 79 and one which McHugh J vigorously rejected. 80 Interestingly, his Honour noted that if there were such a test, it would be impossible to justify the detention of an alien once it appeared that deportation could not be effected in the foreseeable future. 81 That Hayne J focused upon purpose in the context of characterisation rather than under Ch III might point to a different test than mere legal operation on the head of power. This view is given further weight by his Honour's assertion that it may be 'useful to ask', when considering a law's connection with a particular head of power, whether the law in question is 'appropriate and adapted' or 'reasonably necessary' or 'reasonably capable of being seen as necessary' for particular purposes -tests more often associated with purposive heads of power. 82 However, as his Honour did not explicitly apply these tests, the status of this statement must remain uncertain.
Chapter III limitations: detention for the purpose of exclusion is non-punitive
Purpose lay at the heart of the majority's analysis of Ch III and the question of punitive detention. For McHugh J, Ch III will be infringed if a law authorises detention other than by curial order and imposes punishment. 83 However, 'a law authorising detention 
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Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ will not be characterised as imposing punishment if its objective is purely protective'. 84 His Honour's characterisation of this protective purpose was broadly stated: 'As long as the purpose of the detention is to make the alien available for deportation or to prevent the alien from entering Australia or the Australian community, the detention is non-punitive.' 85 Relying upon comments made by Latham CJ in O'Keefe v Calwell that '[t]he Government of a country may prevent aliens from entering, or may deport aliens … Exclusion in such a case is not a punishment for any offence', 86 his Honour concluded his decision with a narrower statement of an exclusionary purpose, connected now to
It is open to the Parliament, therefore, to enact legislation that requires unlawful noncitizens to be detained so as to ensure that they do not enter Australia or the Australian community and can be deported when, and if, it is practicable to do so. 87 As noted above, purpose was also the touchstone for Hayne J's approach to Ch III, although his Honour continued to link purpose back to the characterisation of the head of power. He thus expressed his agreement with the Lim test to the extent that it draws a 'distinction' (presumably between punitive and non-punitive laws) which depends upon 'the identification of the purpose of detention'. 88 Thus far, the reasoning is not inconsistent with Lim insofar as it recognises the capacity for Ch III to protect against punitive legislation. However, almost everything that follows represents a strategic retreat, and the creation of a new, narrower, approach to the operation of Ch III.
Revisiting Lim's predicate: the constitutional immunity For Hayne and McHugh JJ, Lim's fatal flaw is its very predicate -the constitutional immunity which asserts that detention will ordinarily be punitive and therefore an incident of judicial power. Swayed by the Commonwealth's submissions on this point, their Honours purported to follow Gaudron J who, according to Hayne J, 'demonstrated' in Kruger v Commonwealth of Australia 89 that 'the line which their Honours drew in Lim is a line which is difficult to identify with any certainty'. 90 As Hayne J noted:
It is a line which appears to assume that there is only a limited class of cases in which executive detention can be justified. And that assumption is at least open to doubt. But doubtful or not, it is an assumption which turns upon the connection between such detention and the relevant head of power, not upon the identification of detention as a step that can never be taken except in exercise of judicial power. That is why it is important to recognise that once the step is taken, as it was in Chu Kheng Lim, of deciding that mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens can validly be provided without This is a crucial paragraph, arguably tolling the beginning of the end of the majority decision in Lim. Once again, Hayne J's touchstone was the relevant head of power, which allows for detention for certain purposes: Lim confirmed that the aliens power supports the mandatory detention of non-citizens for the purpose of excluding noncitizens from the Australian community and, therefore, even if there is a general immunity, the detention of 'unlawful non-citizens' is an accepted and complete exception to it.
The cooption of the Lim test by the characterisation process and the doubt thrown on the constitutional immunity are themes picked up in Woolley by McHugh J. His Honour had skirted these issues in Al-Kateb, merely noting as an aside that Lim can be distinguished from the situation where the purpose of detention is exclusion, not 'deportation'. 92 As if dissatisfied with the brevity of this answer, his Honour took a more root and branch approach to Lim in Woolley, starting with the constitutional immunity. The reasoning here is based on three main points. First, there is the argument from logic: just because courts punish people by detaining them does not support a conclusion that executive detention is normally punitive. 93 Secondly, and in support of this first point, his Honour emphasised (as did Hayne J in Al-Kateb) the number of 'exceptions' to the rule that detention is normally punitive, are presented as if the categories of exception were not closed. 94 Thirdly, his Honour asserted that it is the object -or purpose -of detention that determines whether a law is punitive in nature, not any a priori proposition. 95 In making these arguments, McHugh J also attempted to draw upon the recently decided Al-Kateb as authority for his approach to Lim. Noting the endorsement of Gaudron J's approach in Kruger by Hayne J in Al-Kateb and Heydon J's agreement on this point, his Honour concluded that 'the statement of her Honour in Kruger [concerning the constitutional immunity] was correct and the dictum of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim to the contrary should not be followed'. 96 McHugh J deals with the Lim test of 'reasonably capable of being seen as necessary' more succinctly by noting the alternative approach taken in Al-Kateb (see below) in which the majority (amongst whom Callinan J is included, despite his Honour's apparent application of the test in Woolley itself) declined to apply the test, seeing the validity of detention 'as depending simply on whether its purpose was to impose punishment on the detainee. 
Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Establishing a test for identifying a 'punitive' purpose Having discarded the constitutional immunity and thrown doubt on the Lim test, the Court was left with the opportunity to re-write the test for establishing what will be a 'punitive' purpose in the context of administrative detention.
Despite his lengthy treatment of this issue in Woolley, McHugh J's conclusion was merely a revised version of his own 'necessity' test in Lim:
[I]f a law that authorises the imprisonment of an asylum seeker also has the purpose of keeping the detainee in solitary confinement without justification or otherwise has a purpose of subjecting the detainee to cruel and unusual punishment, it would go beyond what was necessary to achieve its non-punitive object. 98 Hayne J took a more theoretical approach to the topic in Al-Kateb, yet also ended up without a precise formulation. Relying upon the five elements of the 'standard' case of punishment identified by HLA Hart in Punishment and Responsibility, 99 his Honour asserted that 'punishment is not to be inflicted in the exercise of the judicial power except upon proof of commission of an offence'. 100 This last point is based neither on Hart nor any specific authority, yet was central to the outcome of the cases: while other forms of treatment may amount to punishment, they will not amount to judicial punishment (thereby calling Ch III into play) unless an actual 'offence' has been proven. Hart's other forms of punishment, to which his Honour indirectly refers, 101 are thus irrelevant.
With this narrow definition of punishment, the result was a fait accompli: immigration detention 'is not detention for an offence', 102 nor is preventing a noncitizen making landfall in Australia or segregating those who do so without permission. 103 His Honour then considered whether deprivation of freedom after a time or in some circumstances will become punitive. In addressing this, his Honour moved away from Hart back towards his touchstone: the head of power supports detention for the purpose of excluding a non-citizen from the Australian community by segregating them, thereby qualifying any constitutional immunity which might conceivably support equating detention with the exercise of judicial power. As a result, '[n]either the bare fact of detention nor the effluxion of some predetermined period of time in detention is said to suffice to engage Ch III.' 104 Finally, Hayne J concluded his decision by considering whether indefinite detention for life will be punitive. His answer sees him leaving behind even his own touchstone of purpose:
The answer to that is simple but must be made. If that is the result, it comes about because the non-citizen came to or remained in this country without permission. The It would appear, therefore, that the 'unlawful' conduct of a detainee is a factor to consider when establishing the non-punitive nature of the detention (but not enough to characterise it as detention for an offence), as is the consequent 'uncertainty' of removal.
Although it preceded his main discussion of punishment, his Honour also stated that the absence of judicial process is an indication that detention is not judicial in nature. 106 107 In brief, for Hayne J, indefinite detention is non-punitive for a conglomeration of reasons: because no 'offence' has been committed or legislated for, because the detainees are being detained for a non-punitive purpose, because the relevant person came to or remained in this country without permission, because the government is unable to remove them due to extra-jurisdictional factors, and because of the absence of judicial process leading to their detention.
Distinguishing between purpose and effect
A theme which several judges appear to have discovered in the interval between the handing down of Al-Kateb and Woolley is the distinction between the purpose and effect of detention. For McHugh J
[t]his distinction is a matter of substance not form. It is not enough that the effect of the law is no different from the infliction of punishment. If the effect of the law is not readily distinguishable from the effect of inflicting punishment, a rebuttable inference will arise that the purpose of the law is to inflict punishment. But, in determining whether a law authorises or requires punishment to be inflicted in breach of Ch III of the Constitution, it is the purpose of the law that is decisive.' 108 On this point, at least, Gummow J is in agreement, 109 
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Justice Gummow: the law's concern with liberty limits the purposes of detention Gummow J agreed with the majority view that the power of Parliament to authorise the detention of aliens is limited by reference to the purpose of detention, although he stressed that these purposes are 'not at large'. 114 And, as with McHugh J, his Honour expressed a preference for the view that the limitations on purpose arise not as a matter of characterisation of the head of power, but as a result of the operation of the limitations imposed by Ch III. 115 Where Gummow J differed from other judges was in his view that Ch III limitations respecting administrative detention are 'enlivened' by the law's fundamental concern with the deprivation of liberty, 116 and not upon a purported dichotomy between punitive and non-punitive laws. 117 The coincidence of punitive and non-punitive purposes in several detention regimes, recognised by the Court in cases such as Veen v the Queen [No 2], 118 was presented as a full refutation to the strict punitive/nonpunitive dichotomy which, according to his Honour, is 'apt to mislead'. 119 The law's concern with liberty underpins the 'constitutional immunity' identified in Lim, which his Honour endorsed. 120 Given this perspective, it was unnecessary for his Honour to engage with Hayne J's Hartian analysis of 'punishment' (or McHugh J's concern about logic and categories): the touchstone is not the creation of an 'offence' but the circumstances of the deprivation of liberty.
As a result of this concern with liberty, the purposes of detention are limited constitutionally to those connected with the regulation of an alien's 'entry, investigation, admission or deportation This leads to the final point, emphasised throughout Gummow J's judgment: not only has the Parliament not been given free reign to define the purpose of detention, the executive itself cannot determine its scope. As his Honour asserted in his penultimate paragraph:
The continued viability of the purpose of deportation or expulsion cannot be treated by the legislature as a matter purely for the opinion of the executive government. The reason is that it cannot be for the executive government to determine the placing from time to time of that boundary line which marks off a category of deprivation of liberty from the reach of Ch III. The location of that boundary line itself is a question arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, hence the present significance of the Communist Party Case. 124 Nor can there be sustained laws for the segregation by incarceration of aliens without their commission of any offence requiring adjudication, and for a purpose unconnected with the entry, investigation, admission or deportation of aliens. 125
Justice Kirby: constitutional values and the effects of detention Kirby J's constitutional deliberations in Al-Kateb occur almost entirely within two interconnected contexts: the constitutional 'fundamentals' which inform the construction of the Act, 126 and the interpretation of the Constitution by reference to 'abiding values' in both the common law and international law. 127 With respect to the broader constitutional principles at work, his Honour concurred with Gummow J's view of the relationship between the limbs of government (ie, that the judiciary must act as a check on the executive) and the foundational status of the principle of liberty in our constitutional system, similarly taking inspiration from the Communist Party Case. 128 However his Honour seemed less concerned with analysing Ch III in any detail than establishing a particular judicial mindset, one informed and mandated by these same constitutional principles or 'values'. To the extent that he set out a formulation for the practical operation of Ch III, Kirby J maintained the orthodox view that 'punishment is the responsibility of the judiciary', that detention 'can turn into punishment in a comparatively short time', and that the existence and (notably) the 'predominance' of judicial power thereby acts as a limitation on laws providing for indefinite detention. 129 By focusing on 'punishment' rather than 'deprivation of liberty', Kirby J did not follow Gummow J in moving the debate away from the punitive/non-punitive dichotomy. However, his Honour failed to identify a test for establishing when detention 'turns into' punishment. And while his Honour endorsed a view (expressed by McHugh J in his extra-curial writing) 130 [i]t always remains for a court to decide, in case of a contest, whether the character of the law is one that prescribes conduct that is, or may become, punitive. In making that assessment, a court will have regard not only to the claimed or apparent purposes of the law but also the objective effects of the law and its practical operation. 132 However, this cannot be demonstrated where the negative impacts are of a general nature; it must be proved by reference to the particular parties before the Court. The evidence in Woolley, being of a general nature about the negative impacts of detention upon children as a category, fell short of this test. 133 Kirby J's reasoning is also significant for his restatement 134 of certain principles of constitutional interpretation -views which have inspired an animated debate between himself and McHugh J, but in which no other judge seems particularly engaged. Thus, for Kirby J both the Constitution and the Act are to be read in light of certain 'abiding values', in particular 'considerations of international law and the common law presumption in favour of personal liberty … and against indefinite detention'. 135 His Honour's defence of the applicability of international legal norms to constitutional interpretation, and McHugh J's vigorous response, will not be analysed in this case note. 136 However it is notable that Kirby J's approach to international law is married with his endorsement of a variety of 'common law constitutionalism' that similarly informs his view of the constitutional role of the Court, an issue to which I will return below.
Chief Justice Gleeson: upholding Lim but expanding purpose
Although Gleeson CJ's judgment in Al-Kateb was brief on constitutional matters, his Honour's lengthier treatments in Woolley and Behrooz indicate that he sits between the majority and minority. He thus can be taken to have endorsed a view of the aliens power as supporting a power to detain for the purpose of exclusion. And while this purpose was expressed narrowly in Al- Kateb, 137 in Behrooz it manifested itself in broad language that echoed the concerns of the Al-Kateb majority to prevent entry to the 'Australian community'. 138 His Honour's views on punishment were also more akin to those of the majority. Showing an affinity for Hayne J's approach to judicial punishment, he thus asserted that '[d]etention is mandatory, not discretionary. It is not a form of extra-judicial punishment'. 139 Furthermore, in Woolley his Honour explained that there was nothing in Lim to suggest that detention of aliens for legitimate purposes would 'take on a different character if, in its application to some particular detainees, or some class of detainees [ie minors], it was capable of causing particular hardship'. 140 Although he acknowledged that the term 'punitive' is a 'problematic concept', 141 the 'severity' will not change the character of the power -if it did, 'the system of mandatory detention would have been found unconstitutional'. 142 Nonetheless, his Honour's restatement of Lim in Woolley stands out as a strong endorsement both of the constitutional immunity 143 and the Lim test. 144 And while his Honour appears to have endorsed Hayne J's view that Lim established a clear exceptional category to any potential constitutional immunity, his Honour also expressed views about the foundational status of liberty that parallel those of Gummow and Kirby JJ, asserting in Behrooz that 'what is punitive in nature about involuntary detention (subject to a number of exceptions) is the deprivation of liberty involved'. 145 As a result of the Chief Justice's position, ascertaining what the cases establish about the exact contours of the operation of Ch III is problematic. With his Honour's endorsement, there is a strong majority in favour of the view that a detention law will be non-punitive if its purpose is exclusion, although it is not clear if such exclusion must be tied to deportation and removal. Furthermore, the test for establishing purpose is unclear, except to the extent that six of the judges (with McHugh J's position somewhat more subtly expressed) have rejected reliance on the effects (or 'severity') of detention for establishing its punitive character, and four judges appear to have applied a subjective test to establish if a purpose is retained. Finally, with Callinan J's apparent endorsement, the Lim test arguably retains a 5-2 majority, although his Honour's silence on the constitutional immunity means that its status is still unknown.
COMMENTARY
The cases present a commentator with a plethora of issues to address. This analysis tackles these issues by focusing on the preconceptions of Australian constitutional roles and arrangements which underpin the reasoning of the judges. First, I consider the different perspectives on the constitutional role of the Court. In brief, the majority considered it inappropriate for the Court to involve itself in either reading down the legislation or limiting the executive's authority. By contrast, the minority considered it not only appropriate for the Court to do so, but consistent with its paramount duty as constitutional guardian. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ consequentialist arguments made by the majority judges to justify their approaches to the extent that they reflect assumptions about constitutional arrangements and the nature of the Australian polity.
Secondly, I consider the approaches to statutory construction. Here two main points are made: the majority's implicit lowering of the bar for rebutting the presumption against indefinite detention, arguably a result of its deference to the other branches in matters pertaining to the control of 'aliens', and the minority's elevation of the presumption into a quasi-constitutional doctrine.
Finally, I consider the key approaches to Ch III from three perspectives: the undermining of Lim without its replacement by a discernible criterion of validity and the flaw in the analysis of 'categories' of non-punitive detention; the implicit reliance on unlawfulness and illegality that permeates the majority judgments; and the problems that remain -both ethical and legal -with respect to the constitutional purpose of exclusion from the Australian community.
The constitutional role of the Court
Protection of constitutional arrangements
As noted, certain judges have very contrasting perceptions of the constitutional role of the Court. In some instances, these perceptions arguably precede and dictate the approaches taken to both statutory and constitutional interpretation.
For the majority, it is no small matter that Callinan J began his judgment with the minority decisions in Zadvydas v Davis, a decision in which the US Supreme Court read a temporal limitation into a statute providing for administrative detention so as to avoid 'a serious constitutional problem' concerning the applicability of the 'due process' clause. 146 According to Callinan J, the Zadvydas minority reflected 'more orthodox expressions of constitutional principle and practical reality'. 147 The expression 'practical reality' echoes the language of the Federal Court in Al Masri, 148 although Callinan J's relevant reality is found in practical political arrangements, not the human consequences of indefinite detention. His Honour thus cited with approval Kennedy J's concern not to commit a 'grave constitutional error by arrogating to the Judicial Branch the power to summon high officers of the Executive to assess their progress in conducting some of the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers …'. 149 As Kennedy J so colourfully put it, '[t]he Court says it will allow the Executive to perform its duties on its own for six months; after that, foreign relations go into judicially supervised receivership.' 150 In a similar vein, our Court's minimal constitutional obligation is not to get in the way. As Callinan J asserted, 'it is the obligation of the courts to ensure that any detention for that [statutory] purpose is neither obstructed nor frustrated'. 151 Kirby and Gummow JJ were similarly concerned with the preservation of constitutional arrangements, but their focus was on the judiciary's positive obligation to uphold certain fundamental values rather than its duty to avoid executive terrain. Integral to their perspective was a reading of the Communist Party Case which requires the Court (in Kirby J's words) to reject '[e]xecutive assertions of self-defining and selffulfilling powers,' 152 and supports an assertion of liberty as a core constitutional, as well as common law, value. Such values assist in identifying an appropriate judicial attitude to adopt when faced with executive detention. This is evident, for instance, in Kirby J's conclusion that the Court must not 'surrender the power of executive detention to a Minister's "intention" ' nor give an open-ended interpretation of Parliament's command that removal be 'as soon as reasonably practicable'. 153 Similar sentiments have already been identified above in Gummow J's reasoning, but they find their most comprehensive expression in Kirby J's reasoning which drew upon a range of sources of tradition. Indeed, Kirby J's reliance on overseas authorities 154 is based less on the methods employed therein as on the 'resistance of the judges of the common law, since early times and until the present age, to the notion of unlimited executive power to deprive individuals of liberty.' 155 As his Honour asserted: the common thread that runs through all these cases is that judges of our tradition incline to treat unlimited executive detention as incompatible with contemporary notions of the rule of law. Hence, judges regard such unlimited detention with vigilance and suspicion. They do what they can within their constitutional functions to limit it and to subject it to express or implied restrictions defensive of individual liberty. 156 In the Australian tradition, this 'common thread' finds its most celebrated expression in the Communist Party Case, which Kirby J presented as supporting his assertion that '[i]ndefinite detention at the will of the Executive, and according to its opinions, actions and judgments, is alien to Australia's constitutional arrangements.' 157 For McHugh J, this portrayal of Australia's constitutional history could not go unchallenged. Drawing examples from the first and second world wars, his Honour noted that the two relevant statutes which provided for broad and discretionary forms of executive detention 158 were tested and upheld in Lloyd v Wallach, 159 Ex parte Walsh 160 and Little v Commonwealth. 161 As his Honour noted, there was never any suggestion that the detention which was allowed under these broad provisions infringed Ch III. 162 McHugh J did not address the obvious rejoinder -made indirectly by Gummow J, who in turn cited the Lim majority 163 -that these laws were passed under the defence power which expands during a time of war. For Gummow J, it was no answer to the general proposition to cite executive detention at time of war. McHugh J's logic is that the exception undermines the assertion; Gummow J's view is that it proves the rule. Kirby J's own response was merely to disparage the authorities themselves. We should be embarrassed, said Kirby J, by this part of our judicial history, just as Korematsu v United States (the Japanese exclusion case of 1944) is now viewed with embarrassment in the United States. 164 In light of subsequent 'legal developments', the war cases are 'of doubtful authority' 165 and 'should [not] be propounded as a precedent and statement of contemporary legal authority'. 166 Oddly, none of the minority judges seized upon the treatment of Lloyd v Wallach and Ex parte Walsh in the Communist Party Case itself, in which the majority recognised that the cases stood against the principle that they were espousing -that is, the need for judicial review of the existence of constitutional facts. Although the judges differed in their treatment of these cases, it is clear that they interpreted the exception narrowly so as to apply only in time of war or grave emergency, or only to the defence power itself. 167
Consequentialism and exclusion: Justice McHugh vs Justice Gummow
The debate about the role of the Court also emerged in the consequentialist arguments before the Court -the attention, in other words, given to the practical and political effects of the decision as a factor in the reasoning. For the government, upholding the Al Masri doctrine would not only result in undue judicial interference with the workings of government, but would have the practical consequence of making ineffective the statutory and constitutional purposes to protect the community. Kennedy J's cynical portraiture in Zadvydas of foreign nations forcing 'dangerous aliens upon us' by refusing to accept their repatriation, 168 cited with approval by Callinan J, 169 finds particular resonance in the Al-Kateb majority's concern to protect the power of the other branches of the government to exclude aliens from the 'community'. Thus, McHugh J, after concluding that Parliament can enact legislation requiring unlawful non-citizens to be detained to ensure exclusion, asserted that to hold otherwise would mean that Interestingly, McHugh J mentioned one other significant consequence at the start of his judgments in both Al-Kateb and Al Khafaji: the 'tragic' result of the majority's conclusions. 171 It appears, however, that this tragedy is not as imperative a consequence as an alien's alleged thwarting of legislation and achievement of de facto citizenship by 'illegal and unwanted' means.
Yet these concerns are problematic in themselves. A released stateless person is hardly entitled to citizenship rights merely by not being detained, nor does he or she avoid the many other restrictions imposed by the Act on release. Ironically, his Honour's crude characterisation of citizenship -which has defied constitutional definition -is reduced to meaning being free from indefinite administrative detention, a position that sits uneasily with his earlier rejection of the so-called constitutional immunity.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Two aspects to the Court's approach to statutory construction stand out as deserving of comment. The first concerns the majority's refusal to apply the statutory presumption against the deprivation of liberty and, by contrast, the minority's consolidation of the rule in a new quasi-constitutional guise. The second concerns the comments made by the majority about the applicability of international law in cases of ambiguity. Once again, judicial approaches to both issues are informed by the respective judges' perspectives of their appropriate constitutional role.
The principle of legality and judicial mindsets
The common law presumption against deprivation of liberty has enjoyed a degree of judicial popularity in recent years, 172 not least in the eyes of the Chief Justice. 173 Given his extrajudicial exposition of the rule, 174 it is perhaps unsurprising to find his Honour 
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Volume 34 ____________________________________________________________________________________ in Al-Kateb adopting the English term 'principle of legality'. 175 It is a step which marks a progression in his Honour's thinking on the nature of the rule itself, one in keeping with a stronger 'rule of law' rhetoric that emphasises the fundamental role of the judiciary in a free society in appealing to a higher standard by which to measure the use and abuse of power.
A similar trend in the development of the 'principle of legality' in the United Kingdom has led some judges and commentators to describe the rule as having constitutional status 176 -a portrayal which sits uneasily in the Australian constitutional context. 177 Nonetheless, a constitutionalisation of the rule can arguably be discerned in the minority judges' description of the principles at play in Al-Kateb. Thus Kirby J asserted not just that the common law rule reflects a judicial inclination to treat unlimited executive detention as incompatible with contemporary notions of the rule of law, but that the Constitution should be interpreted 'in the light of these abiding values.' 178 A similar attitude is evident in Gummow J's recasting of the rule of construction itself, jettisoning the language of legislative intent in favour of the judiciary's obligation to 'eschew' a particular reading. 179 In doing so, his Honour has neatly replaced the troublesome fiction of parliamentary intent with an appropriate judicial disposition -one informed, of course, by the common law.
The tools and precedents for reading down the provision were undoubtedly also available to the majority. That they did not use them arguably begs more questions about their assumptions and predispositions than about their interpretative techniques, especially in the absence of an express provision allowing for indefinite detention.
In this sense, Callinan J's decision is the most candid for setting out those constitutional assumptions which underpin his statutory analysis. For his Honour, the key principle at play is simple: the Court should not frustrate Parliament's purpose or obstruct the executive. This is a perspective of the Court which his Honour has taken on other occasions, including when expressing concern about the potential opprobrium the Court would face should it apply the rule of construction. 180 And while Hayne and McHugh JJ were silent on the rule itself, relying solely upon the intractability of the statute, their decisions were clearly based on a similar deference, evident for instance in their endorsement of a reading of the legislation that depends upon the subjective purpose of an executive officer and their elevation of a parliamentary temporal limitation ('as soon as reasonably practicable') over the practical reality of indefinite detention. For Hayne J, this deference was also reflected in his prioritisation of the characterisation process over any Ch III limitations that may exist and his explicit reliance on Griffith CJ's assertion that the judiciary must not second guess the wisdom of the Parliament in such matters. 181 This emphasis on Parliament's power and intent rather than judicially imposed limitations required the majority to distinguish themselves from Australia's greatest legalist who saw nothing amiss in implying a temporal limitation into similar provisions. The irony of rejecting Dixon J in the name of an allegedly strict legalist construction of the Act is enhanced by the perverse consequence of their reasoning. Thus, while Dixon J read a temporal limitation into the purpose of detention, such a reading was not now open because, as Hayne J asserted, 182 the legislature had expressed its will by inserting a provision to ensure that removal occur 'as soon as reasonably practicable'. The Court thereby found itself in the position of endorsing indefinite detention, potentially for life, on the basis that the legislature had fixed a time limit to it. 183 It is a classic case of legal double-think whereby two contradictory statements are accepted simultaneously: that a person may be detained forever (and the Court cannot intervene) because Parliament has legislated for detention to end.
The international law debate
Similarly reflecting a more robust deference to Parliament is the critique of the established rule of construction that the legislature is taken not to have intended to legislate in violation of the rules of international law, seen most starkly in McHugh J's concern about the fictional nature of the rule 'under modern conditions '. 184 This focus on Parliament's actual, subjective intent confronts two problems, one practical, the other theoretical.
At a practical level, his Honour overlooked the role played by the legislative process in ensuring that applicable human rights instruments are brought to light. Internal administrative processes (such as analyses by departmental officers, the Australian Government Solicitor and the Office of Legislative Drafting), consultative procedures (such as departmental community consultations), and the progress of a Bill through Parliament via debate and Committee scrutiny all act to identify relevant international obligations with which legislation might come into conflict. In this sense, his Honour overstates the impossibility of the task. Such mechanisms work particularly well with respect to human rights treaties, whose content has increasingly become part of the working knowledge of those in the business of law-making. Indeed, it is hardly to be imagined that a legislator would not be aware that a law depriving someone of their liberty might put Australia in breach of an international human rights obligation.
The more fatal criticism, however, is theoretical. As several judges have pointed out, the 'intention of Parliament' is indeed a fiction, and must be treated as such. Given Kirby J's propensity for citing McHugh J against himself, it is perhaps surprising that he failed to exploit his Honour's assertion in Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill that 'the intention of Parliament is not the collective, psychological state of mind of the individual members of Parliament; it is the intention which is inferred from the terms of the enactment.' 185 That McHugh J has in the past submerged parliamentary intent into the purposive approach and asserted an objective test for establishing 'intention' adds fuel to Kirby J's criticism of his departure in Al-Kateb into a diatribe about subjectivity when it comes to international law.
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS: THE LIMITS OF LIM AND THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The cases raise a host of constitutional issues ranging from the relationship between the limbs of government to the nature of Ch III's purported protections. Of these, it is worth isolating those which give clues to the new constitutional landscape. As became apparent in argument, the government had come to see Lim as a potential impediment to their case, stressing instead Gaudron J's concerns about Lim as fleshed out in Kruger. This undeniably paid off, with Hayne and McHugh JJ both endorsing Gaudron J's scepticism. As a result, Lim now stands on very shaky ground: the constitutional immunity and the Lim test of 'reasonably capable of being seen as necessary' have been significantly undermined, and the non-punitive purposes which will sustain administrative detention have been extended to include a potentially much broader category of 'exclusion from the Australian community' by segregation.
In considering how the Court achieved this maximalist interpretation, this commentary considers three main points.
First, it is necessary to consider the basis of the majority's criticism of the constitutional immunity from detention, and whether the Court has articulated a discernible and user-friendly test for what will amount to 'punishment' in order to trigger the operation of Ch III. Secondly, there is a need to engage with the purpose of exclusion, identified by the Court as validating mandatory indefinite detention. I argue that the purpose itself is inconsistently defined, reflecting a notion of internal control that is an unfortunate part of our constitutional inheritance.
Finally, it is useful to consider the language of 'unlawfulness' in which much of the constitutional analysis is framed, as it is arguably infected with societal attitudes towards non-citizens that undermine the strength and authority of the reasoning itself.
A precarious constitutional immunity
At least three judges have now rejected the view that, subject to certain exceptions, there is a 'constitutional immunity' from detention available either to citizens or noncitizens.
Hayne J, with whom Heydon J concurred, threw doubt on its status in Al-Kateb, 186 drawing upon Gaudron J's concern in Kruger that the number of 'exceptions' to the alleged rule disprove it. 187 McHugh J expressed similar concerns in Woolley, enumerating a set of circumstances in which administrative detention would not be characterised as penal or punitive, 188 and similarly endorsed Gaudron J's comments in Kruger. 189 The dominant argument here is founded on the view that a rule cannot operate either with too many exceptions, or where the categories of exceptions have not been or cannot be exhaustively identified. Thus McHugh J presented his list -as the Solicitor-General did in argument 190 -as if it were the mere tip of the iceberg upon which the constitutional immunity must flounder.
These predicates, however, are problematic. It is, after all, far from exceptional to have exceptions to a legal rule. Indeed, all international instruments which protect the right to liberty and security of person itemise categories of exceptions. Relevantly, the six exceptions in art 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 191 more than adequately, and very accurately, cover each scenario portrayed by McHugh J in Woolley. 192 It could hardly be said that the right in European law is any less fundamental for the existence of these exceptions, let alone non-existent. The practice in other jurisdictions supports the exact opposite argument: rather than undermining the right of liberty, it is around these exceptions that judicial scrutiny in protecting the right most often revolves, as the House of Lords has recently demonstrated. 193 The fact that judges in both the majority and minority failed to consider the established nature of these exceptions in other jurisdictions reflects the poverty of the rights discourse in our legal system, and the increasing isolation of Australia from the rich and established human rights legal culture overseas.
Unpacking the new punishment test
Despite the undermining of the constitutional immunity, it is clear that a punitive detention law will still breach Ch III. However, the majority's starting (and it seems end) point for determining whether a scheme of administrative detention is punitive lay with the characterisation of the purpose of detention, not any assumption that detention will be punitive unless it falls into a recognised category of exception. 194 By itself, this is neither contentious nor necessarily inconsistent with Lim. Yet as McHugh J commented in Woolley, none of the majority judges in Al-Kateb directly applied the Lim test as determinative in establishing whether the purpose of exclusion was punitive. 195 Despite this, McHugh J may have been premature in declaring the Lim test obsolete. With endorsements by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and (crucially) Callinan JJ (in Woolley), 196 and no express disavowal from Hayne J, the test can still be considered to command a majority on the Court.
Furthermore, while three judges have found it necessary either to dismantle or undermine the Lim test, they have failed to replace it with a clear alternative. This inability to formulate coherent standards of review appears to be a persistent weakness of the Court. 197 For instance, Hayne J's transposition of the Lim test into the characterisation process is intriguing, but ultimately amounts to its elimination given the breadth of the purpose of exclusion. Furthermore, it is unclear how a formulation which is effectively a proportionality test can be applied to a law directly operating on a subject matter power.
McHugh J stayed within Ch III, but his restatement of a 'necessity' test for establishing 'punitive' purpose leaves the reader baffled as to how such a test would be less onerous to meet than a 'reasonable necessity' test, or even an 'appropriate and adapted' test. And while his Honour intimated that the circumstances of detention may become indicative of a punitive purpose (eg, keeping a detainee in solitary confinement without justification), he provided no test beyond necessity for identifying such circumstances. 198 One is left wondering, for instance, how housing a traumatised child indefinitely in overcrowded conditions in the desert thousands of miles from his or her community falls within the 'sole purpose', 'necessity' and 'justifiability' test on this reasoning, given that his Honour has already said that detention of unforeseeable duration alone would fail a proportionality test. 199 Interestingly, the minority judges were arguably more ruthless in shunning the consequences of detention when determining its purpose. Thus Gleeson CJ (in Woolley) ruled out the possibility that the 'severity' or 'hardship' of mandatory detention can change the character of mandatory detention, noting that if that were possible, the system would indeed be unconstitutional. 200 Similarly, Gummow J in Woolley was at pains to point out that the effects of detention must not be confused with the purpose. 201 Only Kirby J expressed the test in such a way as to retreat from an exclusive reliance on purpose, asserting that in our constitutional system, the Court must retain the power to determine whether the 'objective effects of the law and its practical operation' will amount to punishment. 202 The view that the 'consequences' of detention do not change its character becomes muddled when pushed too far. As noted, McHugh J provided that consequences might become punitive if not justified, thereby merely begging the question. And for Hayne J, his concluding explanation for why detention for life is an irrelevant consequence for determining punishment raises even more problems: 'it comes about because the noncitizen came to or remained in this country without permission.' 203 It is hard not to interpret this reasoning as an attribution of fault, one hardly in keeping with the broader legalist arguments about purpose which otherwise characterised the majority's reasoning.
Hayne J analysed the notion of 'punishment' in the most detail, yet also failed to craft a discernible test. His Honour's selective and uncritical use of Hart results in a definition that appears to require a legislated offence, ignoring that writer's broader sub-standard cases which could easily accommodate the mandatory detention regime. Some commentators have expressed concern that Hart's standard definition confuses a theory of punishment with a definition, thereby justifying practices which are normatively criticisable. 204 Indeed, Hart himself described his secondary cases as being 'among many other possibilities', asserting that they should prevent the use of what he calls the 'definitional stop' in discussions of punishment which would otherwise be an 'abuse of definition'. 205 Hayne J, following a propensity for the Court to rely on simplified Hartian theory, 206 falls into exactly this trap.
Hayne J also intimated that the existence of judicial-type process will be relevant in determining whether judicial power has been exercised to impose judicial punishment. 207 Thus, if detention is not imposed following judicial-type procedures to ascertain the commission of a statutory offence, it will not bear the hall-marks of judicial detention, and will not be characterised as judicial punishment.
So far, the logic is compelling, but unnerving, providing Parliament in effect with the power to legislate its way out of any Ch III limitation that might depend upon the existence of a 'punishment'. It throws into sharp relief the status of the separation of powers as a guarantor of rights 208 if it can be skirted so easily by the very draconian nature of the provisions themselves: their mandatory operation, the removal of 'offence' provisions, and the absence of judicial process.
Interpretive denial and the rhetoric of unlawfulness A tacit attention to fault arguably permeates the decisions of several judges. Most often, it is cloaked in the rhetoric of 'unlawfulness'. This is seen, as noted, in Hayne J's conclusion about why detention for life would not be punitive for a non-citizen who entered Australia without permission; 209 in Callinan J's blunt statement that Parliament can determine the basis upon which 'illegal entrants' are to be detained and his concern not to award an advantage over others to those who 'illegally ... penetrate' Australia's borders; 210 and in McHugh J's consequentialist argument that those who unlawfully enter should not be allowed to thwart the operation of the Act. 211 Each majority judge at some point thus merges the category of 'unlawful' noncitizens with those who entered without permission, ignoring the fact that the term 'unlawful' has no such legal equivalency. Indeed, the majority's reasoning applies equally to all unlawful non-citizens, the majority of whom become unlawful after entering (lawfully) on visas. And while Hayne J's reference to those who 'remain without permission' arguably covers this category, his focus on an alien's active conduct is misleading. Parliament can define who is unlawful on the basis of almost any criteria including, presumably, race, religion, political opinion, or even alienage itself, as well as circumstances outside a person's control. 212 Any such person must be detained, regardless of their conduct or mode of arrival. Indeed, there is nothing in the ratio of the majority that requires 'unlawfulness' in order to sustain the purpose of exclusion to validate a detention law with respect to aliens. To focus on their unlawfulness is therefore a distraction: it stands as no impediment to absolute parliamentary power to exclude by segregation aliens more generally.
McHugh and Callinan JJ's merging of 'deportation' and 'removal' only contributes further to the impression that all 'unlawfuls' are the same. As the Al Masri court aptly demonstrated, both the legislation and the Lim majority treat the two categories very differently. Indeed, the Al Masri doctrine did not, and on its reading of Lim could not, extend to those facing deportation (ie, because of their conduct), but only to those who sought their own removal and did not frustrate its occurrence -a 'no fault' category, if you will. 213 Unfortunately, such subtlety is absorbed, or hidden through a process of interpretive denial (seen most starkly in McHugh J's eventual rejection of the term 'indefinite' itself), 214 by uncritical use of the term 'unlawful' and (more blatantly) by Callinan J's unnerving concern with illegality and queue jumping. 215 That both Hayne and Callinan JJ concluded their decisions by expressing an opinion that aliens take a known risk when they come to Australia compounds the conclusion that a concern with an alien's conduct tainted the majority's judicial approach. 216 Given the size and social significance of Australia's migration programme, it can hardly be argued that everyone who comes to Australia or is born in the country to non-citizen parents knowingly undertakes a risk of indeterminate, indefinite detention.
THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUSION AND THE HOPELESS CASE
The majority arguably expanded the non-punitive purposes identified in Lim that will sustain administrative detention of non-citizens to include the purpose of excluding non-citizens from the Australian community -what McHugh J called a 'protective purpose'. 217 Yet despite the repeated reference to a purpose of 'exclusion', its exact contours were inconsistently drawn. For instance, Hayne J at one point defined the relevant purpose (consistently with Lim) as arising out of the executive power to exclude -a broad category 218 -while in other places his Honour limited it to circumstances where removal is intended ('detention in the meantime') 219 or to the segregation of those who made an unlawful landfall (ie, those who without permission 'manage[d] to find their way here'). 220 By contrast, McHugh J almost always defined it broadly. 221 Indeed, distinguishing the Lim test by reference to Lim's consideration of 'deportation' rather claiming its potential benefits. 229 While our majority judges should not be accused of having the same prejudices which motivated the framers, the decision -and the language used to defend it -relies upon an embedded understanding of exclusion and control that is perhaps more a reflection of Australian culture and history than an inherent incident of sovereignty, let alone a necessary tool of constitutional interpretation. 230 Finally, how to establish whether a 'purpose' remains on foot fundamentally split the Court, as did whether a purpose can revive once spent. 231 Again, the differences lie in preconceptions about constitutional arrangements. From the minority's perspective, the 'continued viability' of a purpose is not a matter purely for the 'motives or intention' 232 -or 'hope' -of the executive. 233 In this sense, their Honours were concerned that a subjective test would allow the executive to define the limits of its authority.
These criticisms are not refuted by the majority. Indeed, in asserting that the Minister need not harbour a hope, only an intention, of removal Callinan J can be taken as endorsing detention even where removal is, in fact, hopeless. 234 For Callinan J, such matters are no business of the Court. For the minority, there is no function more central to its constitutional function than to guard this line, and only an objective test of purpose can ensure this.
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CONCLUSION: AL-KATEB AND THE
TRAGEDY OF CONSEQUENCES
Despite the firmness with which they expressed their views, there are intimations that the majority are uncomfortable with the human consequences of the laws whose validity they uphold. This is best exemplified in McHugh J's opening and closing paragraphs in Al-Kateb in which he bemoaned the 'tragic' consequences of the Court's conclusion. 235 At a personal level, at least, his Honour mourns the human costs of his own reasoning. At a professional level, he is concerned to avoid creating any inconvenience for the sovereign legislature.
For his Honour, this is a tragedy that the Court is powerless to prevent. It is Hellenic-style fatalism at its very best, generated by the inherent logic and remorseless working of the Constitution, 236 and deepened by the Judge's very consciousness of the role he must play. This is the Constitution which McHugh J leaves us: one that more reflects the prejudices of its framers than contemporary values and the human realities of its operation. By contrast, the Constitution of the minority is informed by certain values -derived in part from our common law heritage -which the Court is mandated to use in order to avert or at least curb the human suffering which an otherwise sovereign Parliament may wreak on citizen and non-citizen alike. 
